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COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
the Court ordered a new trial, this case would conclusively answer those who ask
whether the presumption has the same force in a suit for double indemnity" and
have the effect of overruling cases which indicate that the presumption's only
purpose is to assist the plaintiff in establishing a prima facie case.1
2
In this writer's opinion, the Court has gone too far in applying the presump-
tion as outlined -in the Wellisch case to this kind of an action. Doubtless the
Court was influenced by the social opprobrium resulting from a decision implying
suicide, but when the Court indicates that the jury should always find death was
accidental where there is a question of fact it imposes an undue burden upon the
insurer when, as is 'the normal case, the only evidence of the cause of death is
circumstantial. Nor is the social policy favoring the payment of life insurance
very persuasive in this instance for life insurance needs are not dependent upon
the manner of death.
Stafemenfs of Good Healfth
In Bronx Savings Bank v. Weigandt,l3 the plaintiff brought an action to
rescind a policy- of savings bank life insurance which it had issued to the deceased
approximately three months before his death. The insurer contended that the
insured had falsely represented that he was in good health;14 and that the
policy never took effect because the insured was not in good health when the
policy -was delivered and the first premium paid. The defendant-beneficiary coun-
terclaimed for the face value of the policy.
The insured, who died as the result of injuries, had stated in the application
that he never had or been told that he had tuberculosis, and none was found by
the Bank's medical examiner. At the trial it was established that the deceased was
suffering from active tuberculosis of the spine at the time he applied for the
insurance, but it was not shown that he knew or had reason to know of his
condition. Faced with the rule that a life insurance applicant's statements are
representations and not warranties' 5-hence rescission will not be granted unless
there is a fraudulent misrepresentation' 6-the plaintiff argued that the Court will
11. See a.g., MATHESON AND PRINCE, EVIDENCE, Foundation Press (1949) p. 35.
12. Jahn v. The Commercial Travelers Mut. Assoc., of Am., 256 App. Div.
835, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 257 (2d Dep't 1939); Steinmann v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
257 App. Div. 656, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 51 (1st Dep't 1939).
13. 1 N. Y. 2d 545, 136 X. E. 2d 848 (1956).
14. These words appeared at the bottom of a page of the application:
"Except as stated' above I am now in good health. The statements herein are
true . . . and made for the purpose of inducing the Bank to issue insurance
on my life."
15. N. Y. INSURANCE LAW §142(3). For definitions and explanations of the
words representations and warranties as regards life insurance contracts see
37 WORDS AND PHRASES 40; BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951) 1465, 1758.
16. Sommer v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 281. N, Y, 508, 4 N, E. 2d 308 (1939).
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rescind a contract when there is an innocent misrepresentation about which a
mutual mistake of fact is made.17 In dismissing the plaintiff's action and affirming
the decisions of the Appellate Division' s and Special Term'9 which had awarded
judgment to the defendant, the Court relied on the reasoning in Sommer v. Guard-
ian Life Ins. Co. 20 The Court held that the parties did not intend to condition the
insurance upon the existence of good health; the representations were aids to the
insurer in determining whether or not it would accept the risk and did not become
a part of the contract so as to provide grounds for rescission if in fact they were
false. To void the policy, then, the insurer must prove the applicant knew the
falsity of his representations.
As a second ground for rescission the plaintiff contended that, since the first
premium did not accompany the application, it was a condition precedent to the
insurance's taking effect that the applicant be in good health when the policy was
delivered and the first premium paid.21 Therefore, the insurance never took effect
because the insured was afflicted with a tubercular disease. A reading of clause "2" by
itself would seem to support the plaintiff's position. But the Court determined that
clause "2" must be read with clause "1" for it immediately follows the latter and
incorporates part of it by reference, and since clause "1" manifests the insurer's
intent to be bound if the applicant is in apparent good health (i.e., acceptable on
the basis of the medical examination and the responses in the application), one
might reasonably interpret good health as having the same meaning in each
instance. Consonant with this interpretation, a reasonable person might conclude
that the policy took effect unless the applicant's health changed between the date
the risk was accepted and the payment of the first premium. This ambiguity is
attributed to the insurer and must be resolved against it.
2 2
Although the Court has advised life insurance companies that, in the absence
of legislation to the contrary, they may condition their protection upon objective
17. See Bloomquist v. Parson, 222 N. Y. 375, 118 N. E. 855 (1918).
18. Bronx Savings Bank v. Weigandt, 286 App. Div. 748, 146 N. Y. S. 2d 625
(1st Dep't 1955).
19. Bronx Savings Bank v. Weigandt, 207 Misc. 820, 141 N. Y. S. 2d 629
(Sup. Ct. 1955).
20. 281 N. Y. 508, 24 N. E. 2d 308 (1939). This decision upheld a judgment
for the beneficiary in a case where the applicant had stated that he was in good
health when in fact he had an easily discoverable heart disease.
21. The insurer relied on the following clause: "I agree that: 1. If the first
premium has been paid when this application is delivered to the Bank . . .the
policy shall take effect as of the date of completion of the medical examination...
provided the Bank shall be satisfied that... the person to be insured was a risk
acceptable to it on said date . .. and provided further that the person to be
insured was in good health on said date. 2. If the first premium has not been so
paid, the policy shall not take effect until the first premium is paid and the policy
delivered while the person to be insured is in good health."
22. Hartol Products Corp. 1b. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 290 N. Y. 44,
47 N. E. 2d 687 (1943).
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good health,23 this case indicates the reluctance of the Court to find this require-
ment where there is the least ambuguity in the contract. Essentially this is sound,
for, having disclosed all information as regards one's state of health and having
submitted to a medical examination, the insured relies upon his policy being in
full force and his beneficiary ought not be deprived of the proceeds because of an
unknown pre-existing impairment of health. This is true even though the
company may not void the policy after two years.
24
Duty to Defend
Does a promise to defend any suit seeking damages against the insured under
a comprehensive personal liability policy encompass a suit to enjoin the insured
from maintaining a nuisance? This question was before the Court in Doyle v.
Allstate Insurance Company.2
The defendant had issued a policy whereby it agreed to discharge any
liability of the plaintiff caused by animals kept on his property, and to defend any
suit seeking damages on account thereof "even if such suit is groundless . . .". An
adjoining land owner and his wife commenced suit to enjoin the insured from
operating a kennel for dogs on the ground that this activity was a nuisance which
impaired the value of their property and was injurious to their health. When the
insurer refused to defend, counsel was retained who conducted a successful
defense. In the instant case, the plaintiff sought to recover $250.00 as legal fees
and expenses in the original suit and in addition $350.00, the cost to maintain
this action.
In reversing the Appellate Division's decision - 6 which had affirmed a judg-
ment granting defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment, the Court rejected
the contention that damages could not have been awarded in the original suit,
defendant's argument in justifying its refusal to defend. The Court recognized
that a plaintiff who fails in proving an equitable cause of action will not have his
case retained so that damages can be awarded upon showing the violation of a
legal right.27 But damages, i.e., a money judgment, are awarded in cases where
the facts are sufficient for equitable relief but it is either impractical or impossible
to grant the relief requested, or where damages are incidental to or in addition
23. Sommer v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., supra, note 16, and cases cited therein.
24. N. Y. INSURANcE LAw §155 (1) (b).
25. 1 N. Y. 2d 439, 136 N. E. 2d 484 (1956).
28. Doyle v. Allstate Ins. Co(., 1 A. D. 2d 738, 147 N. Y. S. 2d 200 (3d Dep't
1956).
27. Bradley v. Aldrich, 40 N. Y. 504, 100 Am. Dec. 528 (1869); Merry Realty
Co. v. Shamokin and Hollis Real Estate Co., 230 N, Y. 316, 130 N. E. 306 (1921).
